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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CANADIAN MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN 
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Sixth Floor, 131 Queen Street 
House of Commons 
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Francine Lalonde  
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Laurie Hawn  
Dave MacKenzie   
Hon. Maxime Bernier   
Paul Dewar  
Greg Kerr  
Deepak Obhrai  
 
March 13, 2010
Dear Members of the (pre-prorogation) House of Commons  
Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, 
 
You will be aware that Osgoode Hall Law School and the Nathanson Centre on 
Transnational, Human Rights, Crime and Security held a Special Forum on the 
Canadian Mission in Afghanistan during the prorogation period (February 8).  
Various materials plus audio/video and full verbatim transcripts for all nine 
sessions are available on the Special Forum’s website at: 
http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku.ca/events/canadian-mission-in-afghanistan/ 
 
Some of you were in attendance two days later, on February 10, on Parliament 
Hill for my presentation, at the invitation of the (prorogued) Special 
Committee, on the results of the Osgoode Hall / Nathanson Centre Special 
Forum.  
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My written submission (which was digested for the 10-minute oral presentation) can be found on 
the following web page: http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku.ca/events/canadian-mission-in-
afghanistan/craig-scott-presentation-to-parliament/  On that page you can also click to a page 
where a PDF can be downloaded of this document, “Moral and Legal Responsibility with 
Respect to Alleged Mistreatment of Transferred Detainees in Afghanistan: Presentation to the 
House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan.”  Also, audio 
of the Special Committee February 10 session will shortly be uploaded on the same page. 
 
In light of recent revelations at the end of February (February 25) and this past week (March 8), 
you may wish to consider segments of the Special Forum dealing specifically with two issues: 
 
Issue 1: Has Canada been sending Afghan detainees to the Afghan authorities (notably, to 
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security in Kandahar) in order for intelligence to be 
obtained, while knowing that torture is amongst the methods used by the NDS?   
 
As you will know, Murray Brewster and Jim Bronskill of the Canadian Press reported on March 
8 on the interrogation activities of CSIS officials (“Canadian Spies Interrogated Afghan 
Prisoners, Insiders Reveal” at (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-spies-
interrogated-afghan-prisoners-insiders-reveal/article1492713 )  It is important that scrutiny 
continue on the question of whether Canada ever received – and indeed systematically received 
and indeed possibly continues to receive – intelligence from NDS that has been extracted from 
interrogations of detainees transferred to NDS by Canada, whether or not CSIS (or any other 
Canadian intelligence officials) were themselves conducting or part of the interrogations. 
 
This issue was flagged in the above-mentioned February 10 presentation to the Special 
Committee (point 7 of the presentation, led up to by points 1-5) and also discussed in the 
question and answer session: 
 
Point 7: 
 
7.  We need to know whether the collection and dissemination of intelligence is, in any 
significant respect, relevant to the detainee transfer issue.  In particular, does Ottawa or 
do Canadian intelligence agents in the field (whether military intelligence or CSIS or 
other) receive information from NDS, notably NDS Kandahar, and, if so, is any of this 
information the product of interrogations of prisoners by NDS? Do we not only receive 
but analyze and make use of this information?  Do we know – or do we ask – how the 
interrogations were conducted that produced the information?  
 
Points 1-5: 
 
1. Canadian society, Parliament, and the people of Afghanistan – in future I will 
simply say “we” – need to understand better why successive Canadian governments did 
not plan for Canada’s own long-term detention capacity in Afghanistan or, once in 
Afghanistan, did not respond favourably to proposals that Canada might cooperate with 
other NATO forces to create a joint detention facility that would be under Afghanistan 
sovereignty but co-run by NATO forces. 
2. We need to know why Canada selected Afghanistan’s National Directorate of 
Security (NDS), a lead intelligence agency in Afghanistan, as the first place in the 
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transfer chain for Afghans detained by Canada and, even more importantly, we need to 
know why Canada continued to transfer detainees to NDS Kandahar despite a wealth of 
credible reports from credible actors on the propensity of NDS to torture those in its 
hands either as a regular habit or a standard operating procedure. 
3. We need to know whether, as asserted by Mr Richard Colvin in his December 16, 
2009, public letter, proposals were received from Canada’s own embassy in Kabul to cut 
NDS Kandahar out of the transfer chain and whether these proposals were rejected by the 
military and/or ministers – and, if so, why? 
4. We need to know whether NDS Kandahar remains to this day the first port of call 
for all, most, many or some of the detainees transferred by Canada. 
5. More generally, we need to be careful not to limit our concern to the period that 
has so far received the most scrutiny, namely, 2005-2007. Our practice in 2008, 2009 and 
now 2010 has also to be subject to appropriate oversight. 
 
This issue was raised at the February 9 Osgoode Hall /Nathanson Centre Special Forum in two of 
the nine sessions.  The session-by-session transcripts on this issue are found under each person's 
session at http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku.ca/events/canadian-mission-in-afghanistan/. For ease 
of reference, consider: 
 
? Session 1 - Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International (Canada), English 
branch, “Responsibility of the Canadian State under International Law and in Canadian Law: 
Charter Review, Public Inquiries, and Civil Liability Lawsuits” 
 
Alex Neve: "Between late 2005 and early 2007, we again wrote several letters to the 
Canadian government. It was becoming apparent that, with an increased Canadian 
deployment focused on the conflict-ridden Kandahar region, the number of prisoners 
taken into custody by Canadian soldiers was rising. Even more alarming, it became 
apparent that prisoners were being handed over to Afghanistan’s notorious National 
Directorate of Security (NDS), an intelligence agency dating back to the era of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980's.  
 The NDS was well known for its abysmal human rights record, including 
extensive torture. In many respects, Canada could not have chosen a worse partner for 
handling prisoners.  
 We continued to press Canada to take a different approach. We urged exploration 
of the possibility of working jointly with other NATO governments, collaboratively with 
the Afghans, to retain responsibility for the captured prisoners, but also to do so in a 
manner that would assist with training, capacity building, reform, and improvements in 
the Afghan prison system." 
 
? Session 3 -- Paul Champ, Barrister, Champ & Associates, Ottawa, “Proving Facts and 
Seeking Evidence in the Charter Litigation by Amnesty International against the Minister of 
Defence: Shadow Boxing with Ottawa” 
 
Craig Scott (directed to Paul Champ): "So, the second thing is, …in all of the 
interactions, have any concerns been raised, and have you sought any evidence of the 
following, which is: is there intelligence sharing going on between the National 
Director[ate] of Security and Canadian Forces or Canadian intelligence agencies? If there 
were, does that deepen the reasons why we would think that the government is so 
reluctant to stop the system of transferring directly to that particular body?  
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        So it’s, let’s say, entirely speculative[ly]—I hope it’s not the case—but we have lots 
of experience with what intelligence sharing can result in. And, also, Canada’s military’s 
behaviour in the last eight years shows how incredibly focused they are on the war effort. 
And if intel coming out of National Director[ate] of Security in Kandahar is deemed to be 
actually very useful to the Department of Defence, are they using it? So I’m just 
wondering if any of that has ever come up in any of the search for information?" 
 
I attach transcripts for each of the Neve and Champ sessions. 
 
Issue 2:  Is there a basis for investigating whether any Canadian officials – members of the 
executive or members of the command structure of the military – bear criminal 
responsibility for knowingly creating and continuing a policy and practice of sending 
Afghan detainees to the National Directorate of Security in Kandahar given both the 
purpose of such transfers and knowledge related to the methods of NDS? 
 
As you will also know, Richard Brennan (with files from Allan Woods) reported in The Toronto 
Star on February 25 on a leaked 2007 legal opinion from the Judge Advocate General (Brig.-
Gen. Ken Watkin) dealing with the possible criminal responsibility of Canadian military officials 
for a policy and practice of sending Afghan detainees to known risk of torture (see “Military 
Told to Heed Abuse Claims” at 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/771198--military-told-to-heed-abuse-
claims). 
 
This too was specifically presented to the Special Committee in my February 10 presentation: 
 
18. Finally, we need to know whether there is a real possibility that, if certain facts 
are clarified and are provable in a court of law, one or more Canadian officials could be 
investigated and possibly charged by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, under 
the ICC Rome Statute’s article 8 – that is, charged with war crimes stemming from 
“grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions’ prohibitions on torture, inhuman treatment 
and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.   Could the 
standards for individual criminal responsibility set out in article 25 of the Rome Statute 
be applicable, possibly article 25(3)(c)’s provision on aiding, abetting or otherwise 
assisting a war crime committed by another but more likely under article 25(3)(d)’s 
provision that says a person shall be criminally responsible “if that person…contributes 
to the commission or attempted commission of [a] [war] crime  by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose …[where] [s]uch contribution is intentional and…made in 
the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”? 
 
To this I would add that criminal responsibility under the UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and corresponding Canadian 
Criminal Code sections must also be considered.  This issue was extensively discussed in two of 
the nine sessions at the February 8 Osgoode Hall / Nathanson Centre Special Forum: 
 
? Session 2 – Williams Schabas, Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI 
Galway. “Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law and in Canadian Law: 
From Field-level to Cabinet-level Conduct” 
 
? Session 9 - Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International 
Law at the University of  British Columbia Faculty of Law, “Canada’s Moral Standing in the 
World: Does Our Detainee Transfer Record Matter?” 
 
I attach the transcript for each of the Schabas and Byers sessions. 
 
*** 
 
In closing, I reiterate the sentiment at the end of my February 10 presentation to the Special 
Committee: my sincere hope is that, especially in the absence of any public inquiry, this Special 
Committee – or you in your individual capacities as MPs – can continue to be an effective part of 
the process of both humanizing our approach to Afghan prisoners and democratizing 
accountability here in Canada. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Craig Scott, 
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; 
Director, Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security 
 
Cc: 
 
The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada 
Michael Ignatieff, M.P., Leader of the Official Opposition 
Gilles Duceppe, M.P., Leader of the Bloc Québécois 
Jack Layton, M.P., Leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada 
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